Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) based adversarial training has become one of the most prominent methods for building robust deep neural network models. However, the computational complexity associated with this approach, due to the maximization of the loss function when finding adversaries, is a longstanding problem and may be prohibitive when using larger and more complex models. In this paper, we propose a modification of the PGD method for adversarial training and demonstrate that models can be trained much more efficiently without any loss in accuracy on natural and adversarial samples. We argue that the initial phase of adversarial training is redundant and can be replaced with natural training thereby increasing the computational efficiency significantly. We support our argument with insights on the nature of the adversaries and their relative strength during the training process. We show that our proposed method can reduce the training time to up to 38% of the original training time with comparable model accuracy and generalization on various strengths of adversarial attacks.
Introduction
With the impressive performance of deep neural networks over multiple tasks, these models are being deployed in a variety of domains including entertainment, finance, healthcare, safety and security. However, a peculiar characteristic of these models is their extreme sensitivity to specially designed imperceptible small perturbations to the input data, called Adversarial Samples. For example, it is possible to make an otherwise highly accurate neural network classifier misclassify by adding a small imperceptible non-random perturbation to a test image [20] .
Out of the various approaches proposed to improve the robustness of deep neural network models, Adversarial Training is found to be most effective [5, 20, 10, 23, 2, 6, 4] . In a typical adversarial training procedure of the model, first adversarial versions of the training dataset are generated and are then used to train the model to increase its robustness on such samples [5] .
There are multiple methods to generate adversarial samples which are called the type of attack [5, 3, 17, 11, 10] . The general principle behind most of the attacks is to identify data points in the input space which are imperceptibly close to the training data points but result in the highest loss function value. This results in the following general formulation [2] max
where L is the loss function between the output of a classifier f θ and the actual label y, d is a distance metric between the original training sample x and the corresponding adversarial samplex and is a predetermined threshold. Different attack methods are designed by choosing different techniques to maximize (1) and different distance metrics in (2) . The main motivation behind generating various types of attacks is that the stronger the generated attack, the stronger the defense that can be developed by training the model against the attack. Researchers have also used a blend of different types of attacks to improve the generalization of the adversarially trained models [2] . In this work, we use one of the most prominent adversarial training frameworks proposed by Madry et al. which incorporates a min-max optimization of the overall objective function with respect to adversarial samples and model parameters. The resulting models trained through this framework are shown to be Table 1 : Natural and adversarial training times in hours for CIFAR-10 image dataset classification. All training runs are done for 155 epochs with two NVIDIA V100 GPUs, the same training hyperparameters and the standard CIFAR-10 training dataset split. Adversarial training is done using 10-step projected gradient descent adversaries with ball size 8/255 and step size 2/255. robust against strong PGD attacks [8] , with MNIST [9] achieving about 90% accuracy on adversarial samples. Although we have tested our approach with the framework proposed in [10] , it is generic and can be applied to other frameworks as well. Adversarial training by Madry et al. aims to solve the following min-max robust optimization problem, min θ ρ(θ); ρ(θ) = E (x,y)∼D max
where f θ (.) is a deep neural network with parameters θ andx is an -ball ∞ adversarial sample of natural sample x having class label y.x is generated using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [8] as explained below in Equation (4) . The true data comes from distribution D and L(·) is the loss function. The maximization seeks to find an adversary which maximizes the loss and the minimization seeks to find the model parameters that minimizes the loss due to the adversary. The minimization is solved via standard neural network optimization techniques. The maximization is typically solved using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) for gradient ascent,
where α is the step size and Π(·) projects the result of the gradient step into the -ball around the original sample, x. We say it is a T -step PGD attack if t + 1 = T . As the value of T increases, the adversaries become stronger which results in a greater chance of misclassification by a trained model. We are required to make T forward and backward passes of the deep neural network to complete the iterative procedure in Equation (4). This is a significant computational overhead to the training process and can be prohibitive for large models. This is especially relevant because one of the insights from Madry et al. is that models with larger capacity are more robust. Furthermore, some adversarial defense strategies involve training an ensemble of neural networks [21, 18, 12] and any per network training time reduction can scale quickly. Table 1 confirms that the training time for adversarial training is significantly higher than natural training when classifying the the CIFAR-10 image dataset [7] for two popular architectures. The same hardware, training dataset, training hyperparameters and total number of epochs were used to obtain all timings. Due to the popularity of adversarial training, we are motivated to focus on improving the computational cost of the adversarial training framework proposed by Madry et al. for image classification tasks. Specifically, we question the need to always perform the expensive maximization of Equation (4) in Equation (3). At the same time we wish to maintain the classification accuracy on both natural and adversarial samples. Although we focus on the adversarial training framework proposed in [10] , our method and insights are not restricted and can be extended for other variants and extensions of adversarial training [2, 3] .
In general, because of the phenomenal drops in accuracy of deep neural networks on adversarial samples, the research community has been mostly focused on improving the accuracy of these models and computational efficiency has taken a backseat or been left largely unaddressed. We believe that as model robustness improves with these emerging methods, the computation complexity will become a crucial factor.
Our contribution We show that adversaries generated in the initial phase of adversarial training are treated more or less like natural samples by the final model. This means they have minimal influence on the learned model and in fact may even hurt the final accuracy. As a consequence of this finding, we demonstrate that using natural, and not adversarial samples, for the initial phase of training gives comparable model test accuracy. We further show that this initial phase lasts for a specific number of epochs and therefore a fully converged natural model cannot be taken as the initial phase. Importantly our proposed training method significantly reduces the training time because the expensive maximization in (3) is not required for a large fraction of the training epochs. We perform rigorous experiments with multiple state-of-the-art deep neural network models and datasets to demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.
Related work
The problem of overfitting with regular adversarial training [10] has been pointed out by several recent works including [2, 23, 14, 13] . Reduced generalization with adversarial training was attributed to training with strong adversarial samples from the beginning [2, 23] . This has led to curriculum adversarial training [2] in which the strength of adversaries (as measured by the number of PGD steps in Madry et al.) in a training batch is gradually increased as training progresses. Wang et al. further explained that the number of steps is not the right measure of adversary strength and they defined a new criterion by linking the strength of adversarial samples to the convergence of the inner maximization in Equation 3 [23] . These works suggest that using lower quality adversaries during the initial phases of training helps improve accuracy. However, their focus is not computational efficiency and still requires adversaries to be computed in the initial phases. Furthermore, it was pointed out in Schmidt et al. that generalization of adversarially robust classifiers cannot be improved by algorithmic design alone as it is inherently tied to the complexity of underlying data distribution [13] .
While the majority of research so far has focused on improving adversarial robustness through designing defenses, much less consideration is given to their computational requirements and scalability, both of which are concerns during adversarial training of complex networks with big and realistic datasets. In an attempt to extend adversarial training to large scale networks, a linearly scalable approach was developed [24] . In Tramèr et al. adversarial training using ImageNet was done using ensembles of pre-trained neural networks to generate adversarial samples, thereby cutting the computational cost of regular adversarial training [21] . Another approach makes use of gradient information from model updates to reduce the overhead of generating adversarial samples [15] . Recently, adversarial training was accelerated by formulating it as a discrete-time differential game [26] .
The trade-offs between generalization and robustness are inherent [22, 19] . Lately, there has been work suggesting that certain values of adversarial training hyperparameters may have unexpected benefits [4] . Using traditional approaches [1] adversarial training hyperparameters were tuned to achieve the right tradeoff between robustness and accuracy. In particular, Duesterwald et al. optimized the fraction of adversarial samples in a training batch (for Madry et al. this value is 1). The appeal of our approach lies in its simplicity as its devoid of any (costly) hyperparameter optimization sub-step.
Switching from natural samples to adversarial samples can be interpreted as a transfer learning scenario. The current literature considers the scenario where the model is adversarially trained on both the source and target datasets to obtain better robustness [6] . Or where the model is adversarially trained on the source dataset and naturally trained on the target dataset [16] . In these approaches, while training on the target datasets may be fast because many epochs are not required, training the model on the source dataset is costly. We do not consider scenarios where we have pretrained models-we must efficiently make a model robust from the beginning.
Delayed adversarial training 3.1 Usefulness of adversaries from the initial epochs of regular adversarial training
In the adversarial training framework natural training samples are replaced by their adversarial counterparts and used as training data from the start of training. Adversarial samples generated using (4) are dependent on the evolving model parameters which are initially randomly initialized. Generally at initialization, the model's parameters are relatively far from their final values. Therefore the adversarial samples generated in the initial training iterations are quite different from the type of adversaries that the model will face towards the end of training. This is because the initial adversarial samples would not maximize the adversarial loss in (3) with the final model parameters. The initial adversarial non-maximizing samples are weak adversaries for the final model and may not be useful for improving robustness. Yet generating them adds computational overhead and they influence the model. To investigate the usefulness of the initial adversarial samples we perform regular adversarial training on a model and test the final model with adversaries that are generated from the model's parameters at previous epochs. We use CIFAR-10 and the test images come from the dataset's standard train-test split which are never seen during training. We use the WideResNet-28x10 architecture [25] and adversarial test samples are generated using Equation (3) and (4) with T = 10, = 8 255 and α = 2 255 . This is a standard architecture and set of adversarial sample hyperparameters for CIFAR-10 in the adversarial training literature [10, 6] . robustness. In spite of this, the computationally expensive maximization (4) is performed to generate these samples for training and these samples are allowed to influence the model parameters.
Delayed Adversarial Training: Initial training with natural samples
As adversarial samples are computationally expensive to generate and not useful in the initial phase of training, we would like to replace them with other training samples until the model reaches some form of stability. Natural samples are an obvious choice for this replacement as we also want the trained model to perform as well as possible on these samples as well. Hence we explore the use of natural samples instead of the adversarial samples during the initial phase of training.
Training on natural samples does not require the costly maximization in Equation (4) and therefore significantly reduces the training time. Consequently the time taken to get the model to an initial stable state, where adversarial samples start to become relevant, is reduced. Furthermore, the model is expected to correctly classify natural samples, but they are never seen in regular adversarial training. Now we investigate the issue of how to quantify the "initial phase" of training and determine a switch point from training on natural samples to training on adversarial samples. In the lower part of Figure 1 , we plot the training loss of full natural training for the same WideResNet-28x10 architecture on CIFAR-10 as in the top figure. We see that the natural training loss flattens roughly at the same epoch at which the strength of the adversaries previously trained become reasonable in the top figure. This is due to the fact that at this point the model parameters have started to converge towards a local minimum. This motivates us to use the training loss on natural samples as an indicator to determine when to switch to training on adversarial samples. We will use this motivation to propose an algorithm for a modified version of the adversarial training process later in this section.
Before coming up with an exact algorithm for switching, we explore our proposition with observations on a set of experiments where we switched from natural training to adversarial training at various points. This is shown in Figure 2 . Here we trained the WideResNet-28x10 on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We performed the initial phase of training with natural samples and then switched to adversarial samples generated using PGD at various switching points. Training and test adversaries are generated using (3) and (4) with T = 10, = 8 255 and α = 2 255 . The learning rate drops after epochs 100, 105 and 150. We show how the accuracy on the natural and adversarial test sets varies during regular adversarial training and adversarial training with different switching epochs. Figure 2 provides evidence that performing the initial phase of the training is indeed a promising approach. We see that except for continuing the training with natural samples for too long (switching after the learning rate drops), we in fact get better performance than regular adversarial training. The training time is also reduced significantly as computing the expensive maximization in Equation (4) is not required until after the switch is made. Before switching, the adversarial accuracy is almost 0% because the model is not robust and is undergoing natural training. Note, that the adversarial accuracy rises very quickly with all the switching points as compared to the case of regular adversarial training where adversarial samples are used from the very beginning (the blue curve). This confirms our intuition that introducing adversarial examples later if i > S then 5 :
end if 7: // if condition replaces natural samples with adversarial samples after epoch S. S = 0 corresponds to regular adversarial training.
8:
Update θ with the optimizer using (x b , y b ) 9:
end for 10: end for in the training process is much more efficient than using them from the very beginning. We provide more evidence of this observation for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 classification with the ResNet-50 and ResNet-18 architectures in the Appendix.
Based on the above observation, we first provide a basic algorithm (Algorithm 1) for our modification to the adversarial training method. We call it Delayed Adversarial Training (DAT). We introduce a new hyperparameter for delayed adversarial training, i.e., the epoch after which training data should be switched from natural samples to adversarial samples. We call this hyperparameter, the switching point, S. In Algorithm 1, S must be chosen in advance. The value of this hyperprameter lies between 0 and the total number of training epochs, N . For maximum computational saving, we would want to use natural samples for as long as possible and hence S should be as close to N as possible. However, as we have seen in Figure 2 , switching too late affects the final accuracy (both on natural samples and on adversarial samples). Specifically, we see this happening when the switch is after the learning rate drop, i.e., explicit actions to promote convergence because this will prevent the model from adapting to the newly introduced adversarial samples. Hence, a naive approach to train the model till full convergence and then switch to adversarial samples is not feasible. Now we provide a method to automatically determine the value of the hyperparameter, S. From Figure 2 , a quick recipe for deciding S is to choose an epoch after the test accuracy on natural samples flattens and before any learning rate drops. Hence, we use the observation on the evolution of training loss from Figure  1 to come-up with a dynamic strategy to switch from natural training to adversarial training. Specifically, we dynamically determine the value of S as the epoch number where the training loss begins to converge. Convergence is determined if the training loss value at the current epoch is within D% of the running average of training losses over the previous W epochs. We depict Delayed Adversarial Training with this switching strategy in Algorithm 2.
It is easy to note that even though we have based our motivation and experimentation on the min-max approach from [10] , our proposed modification to the regular adversarial training can be easily extended to other frameworks which use different type of attacks in their training process.
Delayed Adversarial Training helps generalization
From Figure 3 we see that with delayed adversarial training, the natural test accuracy is often better as compared to regular adversarial training. Also, there is a larger adversarial accuracy jump after the learning rate reduction at epoch 100 which is indicative of better generalization. This happens because in the case of delayed adversarial training, the model is not overfitting to adversaries of little relevance in the initial phase of training (see Figure 1 ). Instead it is learning to classify natural samples which we always desire to be correctly classified.
We can further confirm that our method helps generalization by looking at the training loss and adversarial test accuracy for regular adversarial training and delayed adversarial training. Figure 3 shows how for each minibatch (x b , y b ) do 5: if i > S then 6 :
end if 8: // if condition replaces natural samples with adversarial samples after epoch S.
9:
Update θ with optimizer and using (x b , y b ) 
Experiments
In this section we evaluate our proposed method for efficiently training robust deep neural network models. We compare the training time and test accuracy of the models trained using the proposed method against regular adversarial training [10] . All adversarial perturbations are ∞ perturbations. We use the standard CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and MNIST datasets in our evaluation.
For CIFAR-10, we use the WideResNet-28x10, ResNet-50 and ResNet-18 architectures with a batch size of 128. With CIFAR-100, we use ResNet-50 and ResNet-18 with a batch size of 128. For MNIST we use a model with two convolutional layers, which have 32 and 64 filters, followed by a fully connected layer of size 1024. Each convolutional layer is followed by a ReLU and 2 × 2 max pooling. The batch size for MNIST experiments is 50.
SGD with momentum 0.9 and weight decay 2 × 10 −4 is used to train the WideResNet-28x10 and all the ResNets for CIFAR. The initial learning rate for the WideResNet-28x10 is 0.1 and it is reduced by a factor of ten after epochs 100, 105 and 150 and the model is trained for a total of 155 epochs. The ResNets also have an initial learning rate of 0.1 which is reduced by a factor of ten after epochs 100 and 150 and the model is trained for a total of 155 epochs. Adam with an initial learning rate of 1 × 10 −4 is used for MNIST. The Adam optimizer state and learning rate is reinitialized after switching. MNIST is trained for 80 epochs. W and D parameters from Algorithm 2 are empirically tuned.
We parameterize PGD adversaries as {T, , α} where T is the number of PGD steps, is the maximum ∞ perturbation and α is the gradient ascent step size (see Equation (4)). For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 all adversarial samples used during training are of strength 10, 8 255 , 2 255 . MNIST adversarial samples for training are generated with {40, 0.3, 0.01}. All PGD adversaries are constructed by adding an initial random perturbation, δ, where δ ∞ ≤ .
CIFAR experiments are performed on a system with two NVIDIA V100 GPUs, 42 CPU cores and 48GB memory. For MNIST experiments we use a system with one NVIDIA V100 GPU, 26 CPU cores and 24GB memory.
We also have an early stopping criteria for the CIFAR-10 models to regularize and avoid training the models for too long without much gain in accuracy. In this case, we stop training after the first learning rate drop once the test loss on the natural samples of the current epoch is within 5% of the average test loss of the previous five epochs.
In this section, we mainly present a comparison of training times and the performance of the trained models against attacks of different strengths to the strength of the adversaries that were used in training. The appendix contains additional plots and results for the different models and datasets which we used in our experiments. Table 2 shows the training times for all the models and datasets. We compare the time taken for regular adversarial training and our method. The timings for the early stopping of CIFAR-10 models are also shown. Note that MNIST experiments are done on a less powerful system than the CIFAR experiments.
Training times
The training times are significantly reduced using our method with often better accuracy. The importance of our method is particularly felt when training large models such as the WideResNet-28x10 on the more complex CIFAR-10 dataset. In this case we get 46.9% reduction in training time. With regularization via early stopping, we get 62.4% savings in training time with this model and dataset. On all other dataset and models also we get significant reduction in training time with accuracies very close to that of the regular adversarial training. In fact, our robustness accuracy is mostly higher as compared to that of regular adversarial training due to better generalization on adversarial samples as discussed in Section 3.
Generalization to other attacks
We evaluate the robustness of our models to attacks of strengths which they were not trained to resist. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the performance with regular adversarial training and our method for the CIFAR-10 models (Figure 15 in Appendix A.2 shows the robustness for CIFAR-100 with ResNet-18). Figure 7 shows it for MNIST. The models trained using our method are comparably robust against the wide variety of attacks. Table 3 summarizes the differences between regular adversarial training and our method for typical benchmark adversaries. We note from Table 3 that increasing the model capacity results in improved robustness for all datasets which is consistent with the observations made by Madry et al.. Also, consistent with Madry et al. is the sharp fall in MNIST robustness when tested with larger than what the model was trained for ( = 0.3). To that end, our method delays the collapse in robustness as we can see from Figure 7 
Comparison to normal accelerated training
One could think of an alternate approach to reducing the time of adversarial training by accelerating the learning rate drops and finishing the training process in a relatively smaller number of epochs. In order to show that our proposed method is complementary to this alternate approach, we conduct an experiment where the total number of training epochs, epochs at which learning rates drops take place and the switching hyperparameter S, are approximately halved. Figure 8 shows the natural and adversarial test accuracy evolution during training for this accelerated training procedure for CIFAR-10 with the WideResNet-28x10 model.
The measured training times for the regular adversarial training and our proposed delayed adversarial training for this experiments are 9.5 hours and 6.8 hours respectively, i.e., 28% saving. Further, as we see from the figure that this experiment gives us almost 2% improvement in adversarial accuracy over regular adversarial training. Figure 9 further shows the performance of the models trained with accelerated training against attacks of different strengths. Here there is slight reduction in overall performance of the models at higher values of . However, when only comparing accelerated models, the performance of the models trained with our proposed method is comparable to the model trained with regular adversarial training.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the computational efficiency of one of the most prominent adversarial training frameworks to improve the robustness of deep neural networks. We presented insights about the usefulness of training with adversarial samples in the initial and later phases of regular adversarial training and proposed a modified version of the training framework which significantly improves its computational requirement. We further show through various experiments that the neural network models trained through the proposed framework are as accurate or better as the ones trained through the earlier framework and generalize quite well to adversarial attacks of various strengths.
In the future, we plan to adapt our general method to other adversarial training frameworks. Furthermore, although our goal is to improve training time, we get better accuracy in many cases. Future work aims to explore this further in order to develop a methodology which considers accuracy and computational efficiency in a more integrated way. 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  Epsilon x 255   15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50  55  60  65  70  75  80  85  90 Accuracy (%) Accelerated regular adversarial training Accelerated delayed adversarial training computationally expensive maximization (4) is performed to generate these samples for training and these samples are allowed to influence the model parameters. Similar to Figure 2, Figures 11 and 12 show the natural and adversarial accuracy during training when different switches are used. The plots are for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively. Figures 13 and 14 show the natural and adversarial accuracy during training when different switches are used. Again we use the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. Figure 15 shows the robustness of ResNet-18 when trained on CIFAR-10 against adversaries which they were not trained to be robust against. Adversaries used during training were of strength 10, 8 255 , 2 255 . A.4 Different seeds with WideResNet-28x10 Figure 17 shows that the same conclusions can be made with different model parameter initialization seeds. The figure shows the WideResNet-28x10 being used for CIFAR-10 classification. The natural and test accuracy like in Figure 2 is plotted for different initialization seeds. The performance is similar across different seeds. Accuracy with and without switching is shown.
A.2 Additional ResNet-18 results

A.3 Additional MNIST results
